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Abstract 
This article analyses the development of local currency sovereign bond 
markets (LCBMs) in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), a potentially important 
source of longer-term public finance. We make two contributions to the 
literature. First, we build a novel dataset comprising 28 SSA countries 
for the period 2000-2014 to uncover the main correlates of LCBM 
capitalization, of local currency bond (LCB) tenors and of LCB issue 
yields. We find that LCBM capitalization in SSA relates to politico-
institutional factors, overall financial development and financial system 
structure. For LCB tenors and issue yields, inflation levels matter too. 
Second, we complement our econometric analysis with qualitative case 
studies of Kenya and Nigeria, where we further investigate the drivers 
of LCBM development and place LCBMs in a broader public debt 
context. While we document the increasing importance of LCBMs in 
SSA, we also highlight new vulnerabilities, including those related to 
investor base composition. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Public debt in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has undergone profound changes over the last 
decade. After having been given a ‘clean slate’ through vast debt relief under the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative and its successor, the Multilateral Debt relief 
Initiative, SSA governments have accumulated new debt to address large infrastructure and 
other needs (Merotto et al., 2015). Until recently, apart from a few cases of explosive debt 
dynamics, the rise in SSA public debt-to-GDP ratios was mostly moderate, helped by rapid 
growth, high commodity prices and large non-debt inflows (Battaile et al., 2015). At least as 
important as the extent of renewed indebtedness, however, is its changing nature. Many SSA 
governments, including in several ex-HIPCs, now have access to a wider range of lenders and 
debt instruments (Prizzon and Mustapha, 2014). In the academic and policy literature most 
attention has gone to the large US dollar-denominated bonds that SSA governments have 
issued in international markets in recent years (see, e.g., Mecagni et al., 2014; Olabisi and 
Stein, 2015; Sy, 2015; Gevorkyan and Kvangraven, 2016; Presbitero et al., 2016; UNCTAD, 
2016). That notwithstanding, it is important to highlight that in SSA marketable public debt is 
now increasingly issued in local currency to private domestic investors, a trend that follows 
emerging economies in other regions, be it with a considerable lag (Didier and Schmukler, 
2014). 
In this article we aim to shed light on the factors driving the development of local currency 
sovereign bond markets (LCBMs) in SSA. We construct a novel dataset comprising 28 SSA 
countries over 2000-2014, allowing us to study the main correlates of LCBM capitalization, 
of local currency bond (LCB) tenors and of LCB issue yields by means of simple panel 
regressions. We complement our econometric analysis with brief case studies of two 
countries with relatively large, yet heterogeneous LCBMs: Kenya and Nigeria. For both 
countries we investigate in more detail LCBM development and its drivers, and place 
LCBMs in a broader public debt context. 
Our article contributes to the understanding of SSA LCBM development, first of all, by 
extending prior studies on LCBM capitalization (Adelegan and Radzewicz-Bak, 2009; Mu et 
al., 2013; Berensmann et al., 2015; Essers et al., 2016) with an inquiry into the covariates of 
LCB tenors and issue yields, and second, by considering a wider range of financial 
development measures as explanatory variables. Our panel regressions indicate that a well-
developed financial sector and higher-quality political institutions relate positively to both 
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LCBM capitalization and average LCB tenors, the latter hinting at the importance of public 
accountability for longer-term investment. Likewise, high inflation, negatively associated 
with average tenors, renders longer-term fixed-income investment less attractive. As regards 
borrowing costs, we find significant negative correlations of average LCB issue yields with 
economic development, banking sector size and overall financial development, as well as 
with past fiscal balances, possibly reflect investor confidence in governments’ ability to repay. 
As expected, the relation between LCB issue yields and past inflation is strongly positive. 
Some of these key relations are corroborated by our qualitative case studies of Kenya and 
Nigeria. 
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines recent trends in public debt and LCBM 
development in SSA. Section 3 presents our econometric analysis of the correlates of LCBM 
capitalization, LCB tenors and LCB issue yields. In Section 4 we illustrate LCBM and 
broader public debt dynamics in SSA with case studies of Kenya and Nigeria. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. PUBLIC DEBT AND LCBM DEVELOPMENT IN SSA 
Since the mid-2000s, the role of private as opposed to (official) bilateral and multilateral 
creditors has increased in SSA. Between September 2006 and 2016, SSA governments, 
excluding South Africa, have raised about US$29 billion through the issuance of 35 dollar-
denominated bonds in international capital markets.
1
 Initially, issuance was spurred by lower 
debt burdens and rapid economic growth in the region, combined with low global interest 
rates and high commodity prices (Sy, 2015; Presbitero et al., 2016), factors which have 
become much less favourable as of recent. 
In addition, SSA governments have begun to raise private financing in local currency from 
domestic capital markets. Historically, SSA countries, much like developing countries in 
general, encountered significant challenges in borrowing in local currency at longer 
maturities, a phenomenon known as original sin (Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999). Even 
now, developing countries with access to international capital markets face difficult trade-offs. 
International foreign currency borrowing tends to be cheaper, in nominal terms, than local 
                                                          
1
 These totals were calculated with data from Thomson Reuters Datastream. The issuing countries are Angola, 
Cameroon, the Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Tanzania and Zambia. 
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currency borrowing in domestic markets. In the latter case investors require additional 
compensation for currency risks, higher expected inflation, changing local regulations and 
financial market frictions (Du and Schreger, 2016). Conversely, for the debtor government 
foreign currency borrowing comes with substantial exchange rate risks. Moreover, 
substituting external, foreign currency debt with domestic, local currency debt may increase 
rollover and interest rate risks because of the typically shorter maturities of the latter; this 
implies it needs be refinanced more frequently and possibly at higher rates (Blommestein and 
Horman, 2007; Panizza, 2010). 
Despite such risks, most SSA LCBMs have grown relative to GDP since 2000, with renewed 
momentum from 2009 onwards (Figure 1). The average LCBM capitalization in the 28 
countries for which we could collect such data amounted to 8.3% of GDP in 2014, up from 
about 5.5% in 2008 (see Section 3 for more details on our dataset). While domestic 
commercial banks continue to be the dominant investors in LCBs in most SSA countries, 
several governments have made strides in attracting other domestic private investors too, 
especially local pension and insurance funds, as well as foreign private investors (Essers et al., 
2016). The decline in the concentration of LCB holdings in domestic banks may help to 
address the sovereign-bank ‘doom loop’, where greater risks of a sovereign debt crisis raises 
risks of a banking crisis and vice versa (Farhi and Tirole, 2016). 
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FIGURE 1 
LCBM development in SSA, 2000-2014 
 
Notes: Data are from AFMI (2016a). For presentation purposes, only six largest LCBMs (relative to GDP, 
evaluated over 2000-2014) are shown separately. Thick black line represents unweighted average of 28 
countries in Table A1 in Appendix. Range represents minimum and maximum values for 22 countries, 
excluding six largest LCBMs. 
 
SSA LCBM development follows a broader trend of debt ‘domestication’, a process also 
observed in emerging economies in other regions (Didier and Schmukler, 2014). Domestic 
debt comprises a large and growing share of total public debt in many SSA countries 
(UNCTAD, 2016). For a sample of 31 SSA countries, Bataille et al. (2015) find that domestic 
debt constituted on average about one third of total public debt in 2013. In 11 of these 
countries, domestic creditors accounted for minimum 40% of public debt (Figure 2). This 
general shift towards more domestic, local currency debt is believed to be the result of 
governments’ desire to mitigate currency mismatches and received a boost when external 
financing conditions tightened during the global crisis. It is also actively promoted and supported 
by international institutions (IMF et al., 2013). On the other hand, SSA’s growing reliance on 
private investors (both domestic and external) mostly reflects changes in donor policies, i.e., 
large external debt relief and a shift from loans to grants thereafter, both of which have 
reduced publicly held debt (Cassimon et al., 2015). 
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FIGURE 2 
Domestic debt (% of total debt) for selected SSA countries 
 
Notes: Compiled from various IMF country reports. Data for Burundi, Gambia and Nigeria are for 2013. 
 
The importance and potential vulnerabilities of LCBMs and, by extension, domestic public 
debt have been increasingly recognised in studies on advanced, emerging and developing 
economies (see, among many others, Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Panizza, 2010; Rethel, 
2012). For SSA, however, the focus is still very much on external public debt, because of its 
historical dominance and, until lately, a lack of good-quality data on domestic debt (notable 
exceptions include Bua et al., 2014 and Ncube and Brixiová, 2015). Our article is closest to a 
set of recent studies that analyse the determinants of LCBM development in SSA 
econometrically: Adelegan and Radzewicz-Bak (2009), Mu et al. (2013), Berensmann et al. 
(2015) and Essers et al. (2016). Unlike these studies, which narrowly focus on the 
determinants of LCBM capitalization, we also investigate the covariates of LCB tenors and 
issue yields, exploiting a novel panel dataset. Moreover, to better gauge the relation of 
LCBMs with other segments of the financial sector, we consider a wider range of financial 
development measures as regressors. 
 
3. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
a. Model specification 
We estimate three series of reduced-form panel data models: 
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TBGDPit = α1 + β1Xi,t-1 + δ1FINDEV i,t-1  + γ1μi + φ1πt + ε1it      (1) 
TBTENit = α2 + β2Xi,t-1 + δ2FINDEV i,t-1  + γ2μi + φ2πt + ε2it      (2) 
TBYLDit = α3 + β3Xi,t-1 + δ3FINDEV i,t-1  + γ3μi + φ3πt + ε3it,     (3) 
where our dependent variables of interest TBGDPit, TBTENit and TBYLDit are different 
proxies of LCBM development: LCBM capitalization as a percentage of GDP, average tenors 
of LCBs, and average issue yields of LCBs; Xi,t-1 is a vector of one-year lagged explanatory 
variables further described below; FINDEV i,t-1 is a measure of financial development; μi are 
country-specific effects; πt is a global common factor; and ε1it, ε2it, ε3it are the error terms. 
We estimate equations (1), (2) and (3) independently using either pooled ordinary least 
squares (POLS, where γ1, γ2 or γ3 are assumed zero) or fixed effects (FE). Whereas the FE 
estimator will suffer less from omitted variable bias (by controlling for time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity between countries), the POLS estimator captures both within- and 
between-country variation. Because of the small sample sizes of our panels and short, 
unbalanced time dimensions, we do not attempt to correct for potential non-stationarity or 
other dynamics of and between our variables. Also, other than by taking one-year lags, we do 
not address possible endogeneity problems, due to the difficulty of finding good instruments. 
Our results should hence not be interpreted as demonstrating causality, a caveat that also 
applies to earlier studies of LCBM development in SSA (Mu et al., 2013; Berensmann et al., 
2015; Essers et al., 2016) and other regions (Burger and Warnock, 2006; Claessens et al., 
2007; Eichengreen et al., 2008; Bhattacharyay, 2013). Nonetheless, we believe the 
econometric analysis that follows contributes to our understanding of SSA LCBMs and helps 
to lay the groundwork for better identification of causal relations as wider samples and longer 
time series become available.  
 
b. Data description 
Our three dependent variables are constructed from the African Financial Markets Initiative 
(AFMI)’s African Financial Markets Database (AFMD), for which data is collected through a 
network of liaison officers from African central banks and finance ministries, complemented 
with information from debt management offices, stock exchanges, regulators and other 
agencies, and harmonised between countries (AFMI, 2016a). We focus here on local 
currency Treasury bonds with a minimum original maturity of one year, issued in the 
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domestic market. ‘LCBM capitalization’ is defined as year-end outstanding LCBs as a 
percentage of GDP; ‘average tenor of LCBs’ is the average tenor of year-end outstanding 
LCBs expressed in years, weighted by individual bond sizes; and ‘average issue yield of 
LCBs’ is the weighted average yield at issuance of all LCBs issued over the year, expressed 
in annual percentages.
2
 
The AFMD has information on the LCBM capitalization and average bond tenors of 28 SSA 
countries over a maximum of 15 years, 2000-2014, although with uneven coverage. The 
AFMD sample of average issue yields is limited to an unbalanced panel of 14 SSA countries 
over 2000-2014 (see Table A1 in the Appendix for details).  
For our explanatory variables in vector Xi,t-1 we start with a selection of regressors that appear 
in the prior work of Mu et al. (2013), Berensmann et al. (2015) and Essers et al. (2016). Log 
GDP and log GDP per capita are included as proxies of economic size and economic 
development, which we expect to be positively related with LCBM capitalization and LCB 
tenors, and negatively with average issue yields. The three-year moving average of the fiscal 
balance to GDP is likely inversely related to LCBM development, since sustained surpluses 
reduce the need to issue LCBs. However, large fiscal deficits could possibly also deter 
potential LCB investors, so that the net effect remains an empirical question. Log inflation is 
taken as an indirect measure of monetary policy (in)credibility; we expect high inflation to be 
a key impediment to LCB issuance, in particular longer-maturity issues, and to require higher 
nominal issue yields to compensate investor losses. Capital account openness, as measured by 
the Chinn-Ito index, helps to impose market discipline and attract foreign investors to 
LCBMs but makes it harder to create a captive investor base. We also include a British legal 
origins dummy, as common law is believed to offer better investor protection than French 
civil law and therefore to positively affect LCBM development. We use composite measures 
of democracy (from the Polity IV database) and institutional quality (from the World 
Governance Indicators) to capture the (likely positive) role of government accountability and 
overall credibility in LCBM development.
3
 
Because of the expected importance of financial development for LCBMs we experiment 
with various measures. First, we consider private sector credit by banks (and other financial 
institutions) to GDP, an oft-used proxy of domestic banking sector size. Local banks often 
                                                          
2
 LCBMs are highly illiquid in most SSA countries and therefore secondary market quotes are not readily 
available. 
3
 See Mu et al. (2013), Berensmann et al. (2015), Essers et al. (2016) for a more elaborated theoretical 
motivation for including these variables. 
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serve as primary dealers and market makers in SSA LCBMs and, in most countries, are 
important LCB investors too. Second, we use a composite index of financial development 
recently developed by IMF staff, which captures dimensions of depth, access and efficiency 
of both financial institutions and financial markets.
4
 In alternative specifications we look at 
associations of LCBM development with banking sector concentration, operationalized as the 
asset share of the largest three banks, and the presence of foreign-owned banks in the 
economy. Ceteris paribus, we expect both variables to be negatively related to LCBM 
capitalization. Banks with more market power and foreign banks are arguably harder to be 
swayed to finance the government at favourable terms. We take the well-known VIX, a 
forward-looking measure of global financial market uncertainty, as our baseline common 
global factor.  
Table A2 in the Appendix presents the descriptive statistics of the just-described variables. 
Between-country variation is clearly larger than within-country variation in the dependent 
and most independent variables, with the exception of inflation and fiscal balances. 
In Figures A1, A2 and A3 in the Appendix we plot each of the three dependent variables 
against individual explanatory variables. LCBM capitalization is positively associated with 
GDP, GDP per capita, democracy, institutional quality, private sector credit and overall 
financial development, and negatively with fiscal balances, log inflation, bank concentration 
and the share of foreign banks (Figure A1). Most of these associations remain visible when 
excluding South Africa and Mauritius, which have the most-capitalized LCBMs in relative 
terms. Similarly, we observe positive relations between average LCB tenors and GDP per 
capita, democracy, institutional quality and financial development (Figure A2). Log inflation 
exhibits a strong negative correlation with LCB tenors. Excluding outlier South Africa does 
not alter these relations. Average LCB yields generally increase with GDP, inflation and 
foreign bank shares, and decrease with GDP per capita, democracy, institutional quality, 
financial development and bank concentration, also when high-bond-yield countries Ghana 
and Mozambique are discarded (Figure A3). 
Finally, Figure A4 in the Appendix shows the interrelations between our three dependent 
variables. Higher LCBM capitalization, longer LCB tenors and lower issue yields tend to go 
hand in hand in SSA, even when outliers are excluded. This corresponds well with Bua et al. 
                                                          
4
 See Svirydzenka (2016) for more details. Importantly, the index does not include direct measures of domestic 
government debt, making it complementary to our dependent variables. 
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(2014), who find that in low-income countries domestic debt portfolios of longer maturity 
bear lower costs, especially in countries with higher financial development. 
 
c. Baseline results 
Table 1 presents the estimation results for different variations on Equation (1). The POLS 
estimates show that better past fiscal balances are negatively correlated with LCBM 
capitalization. Most likely, smaller borrowing needs translate into lower volumes of 
outstanding LCBs. Also in line with prior studies, democracy and institutional quality relate 
positively to LCBM capitalization, although not very significantly. Taken at face value, this 
seems to imply LCBMs can better thrive in a context of good governance. LCBM 
capitalization is also higher in larger, more developed SSA economies with a more open 
capital account, but these relations are not particularly robust. 
We observe highly significant positive correlations with private sector credit and broader 
financial development, suggesting LCBMs and other financial sector segments are typically 
complements rather than substitutes in SSA. In addition, banking sector concentration 
correlates negatively with LCBM capitalization, as does the presence of foreign-owned banks. 
An explanation may be that in a concentrated, oligopolistic banking sector the few banks that 
exist may enjoy high returns, which would give them little incentive to help the government 
in financing itself through the capital market. Foreign banks may have more outside 
investment options than domestic banks and may be less easily persuaded to buy government 
LCBs. 
As expected, it is much harder to find significant results in the FE estimates, due to limited 
within-country variation in our sample.
5
 That said, we still find a significantly positive 
association between institutional quality and LCBM capitalization. Moreover, the coefficients 
of the different financial development variables have the same sign and are of similar 
magnitude as when estimated by POLS. The VIX has a negative coefficient which borders on 
significance, suggesting global market uncertainty hampers LCBM capitalization. 
 
                                                          
5
 Hausman-type overidentification tests indicate a preference for FE over random effects (RE) from a 
consistency perspective. 
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TABLE 1 
Regression results for LCBM capitalization 
 
 POLS FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log GDP 0.360 0.430 0.401 0.497 -0.491 1.423*** -2.732 -3.291 2.941 2.823 -4.759 3.014 
 [0.449] [0.414] [0.538] [0.594] [0.878] [0.435] [12.129] [12.188] [12.452] [13.576] [14.682] [16.360] 
Log GDP per cap. 0.982* 0.926* 0.974* 0.252 0.397 -0.957+ 6.776 7.379 -0.122 0.442 9.166 0.645 
 [0.558] [0.526] [0.529] [0.729] [0.758] [0.720] [14.294] [14.339] [14.366] [16.394] [17.539] [20.005] 
Av. fiscal balance -0.399** -0.367*** -0.386*** -0.463*** -0.371** -0.466*** 0.005 -0.001 -0.004 0.000 0.025 -0.093 
 [0.149] [0.124] [0.120] [0.113] [0.160] [0.151] [0.074] [0.075] [0.081] [0.080] [0.094] [0.072] 
Log inflation 5.233 3.597 3.606 -3.437 -0.196 -2.230 4.587 4.437 6.887 9.502 9.419 12.771 
 [4.480] [4.216] [4.485] [4.310] [5.332] [4.153] [7.546] [7.558] [7.389] [7.694] [9.225] [12.167] 
Cap. acc. openness 0.554+ 0.536+ 0.572 0.310 -0.054 0.700+ 1.198 1.212 0.929 -1.014 -0.728 -0.876 
 [0.397] [0.405] [0.446] [0.551] [0.615] [0.468] [1.739] [1.741] [1.487] [0.977] [1.068] [1.065] 
British legal origins -0.062 -0.066 -0.187 -0.741 -0.220 -1.671       
 [0.773] [0.717] [0.837] [0.918] [0.840] [1.335]       
Democracy  2.760+ 2.965+ 3.298+ 2.791+ 0.316  2.535 -1.958 -1.119 -2.605 1.146 
  [2.026] [2.075] [2.207] [1.945] [1.821]  [3.291] [3.945] [4.110] [4.362] [4.301] 
Institutional quality   0.029 0.740 -0.051 2.658   13.128** 10.006* 7.674+ 11.405* 
   [2.071] [1.909] [1.922] [2.167]   [6.308] [5.619] [4.786] [6.518] 
Private credit 0.221*** 0.211*** 0.210***    0.276 0.276 0.244    
 [0.028] [0.031] [0.036]    [0.221] [0.221] [0.199]    
Fin. development    52.504*** 56.292*** 51.072***    57.163+ 74.842+ 51.027 
    [7.595] [8.975] [8.895]    [42.629] [46.113] [55.909] 
Bank concentration     -0.097*      -0.089+  
     [0.057]      [0.052]  
Foreign bank share      -0.035+      -0.063 
      [0.024]      [0.082] 
VIX 0.001 -0.004 0.004 0.005 0.022 0.006 -0.047+ -0.046 -0.062+ -0.071* -0.059+ -0.059 
 [0.036] [0.035] [0.038] [0.034] [0.035] [0.034] [0.036] [0.036] [0.037] [0.038] [0.041] [0.046] 
Constant -31.898+ -25.521 -26.036 7.631 1.511 9.374 -61.786 -65.807 -57.291 -72.003 -105.418 -89.617 
 [21.502] [19.444] [21.370] [22.246] [25.209] [20.913] [90.237] [90.167] [89.690] [107.721] [120.003] [148.153] 
Obs./countries 270/27 270/27 254/26 261/27 242/26 232/23 270/27 270/27 254/26 261/27 242/26 232/23 
R
2
/R
2
-within (FE) 0.782 0.786 0.792 0.755 0.771 0.781 0.354 0.355 0.367 0.321 0.428 0.297 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is outstanding LCBs (% of GDP). Sample countries, years and variables as defined in text and Tables A1-A2 in Appendix. All independent variables are one-year 
lagged, except for VIX. Country-clustered standard errors reported in brackets. ***p<0.01;**p<0.05;*p<0.10;+p<0.20. 
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Table 2 gives the estimation results for Equation (2). When using POLS, the strongest results 
are observed for banking sector and broader financial development, both of which correlate 
positively with average LCB tenors (in line with Table 1). The democracy coefficient is again 
positive and significant. Government accountability may be important to ease the minds of 
investors in longer-term LCBs. Likewise, high inflation renders longer-term fixed-income 
investment less attractive. Somewhat surprisingly, a higher VIX is associated with longer 
average LCB tenors. One possible explanation is that in times of greater uncertainty long-
term external finance is harder to come by for SSA governments and a relative increase in 
longer-tenor LCBs needs to make up for that. Or, alternatively, international investors may be 
more willing to take risks in ‘frontier markets’ when risks rise globally, leading to greater 
appetite for longer-tenor SSA LCBs. Such speculative hypotheses require further research. In 
column (7) of Table 2 we replace our financial development measures with LCBM 
capitalization. The association with LCB tenors is positive but not significant in the presence 
of other regressors. 
Turning to the FE regressions for LCB tenors we find very few significant results, apart from 
the same positive correlation with VIX and a correlation with economic size. The highly 
significant negative association with LCBM capitalization suggests that within one single 
country an increase in the outstanding volume of LCBs may come at the expense of maturity 
lengthening. 
Lastly, Table 3 contains the POLS and FE estimation results for Equation (3). The former 
display significant negative correlations of average LCB issue yields with log GDP per capita, 
banking sector size and overall financial development, and a strong positive correlation with 
log inflation. The negative association with fiscal balances may be due to more sustainable 
government finances instilling greater investor confidence. The negative correlation with 
bank concentration could be the result of a close relation (collusion) between governments 
and a few dominant banks. Moreover, when the banking sector is less concentrated (more 
competitive), banks may be more engaged in corporate lending, lowering demand for 
government LCBs and pushing up yields. The positive coefficient for institutional quality 
seems counterintuitive. A higher foreign bank share is associated with higher yields, as 
foreign banks may need to be compensated more to invest in LCBs than domestic banks 
(often naturally hedged because of their local currency liabilities). Longer LCB tenors again 
seem to go hand in hand with lower yields (see Figure A4 in the Appendix and Bua et al., 
2014). 
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TABLE 2 
Regression results for average LCB tenors 
 
 POLS FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Log GDP -0.054 0.014 -0.043 -0.025 0.281 -0.125 0.278 5.672* 6.070* 3.858 4.460 6.888* 2.061 6.697** 
 [0.202] [0.201] [0.303] [0.283] [0.394] [0.290] [0.355] [2.942] [3.066] [3.766] [3.614] [3.913] [3.891] [3.092] 
Log GDP per cap. 0.151 0.113 0.126 -0.005 -0.202 0.230 0.244 -5.154 -5.588+ -2.856 -3.555 -6.477 -0.770 -5.874+ 
 [0.359] [0.320] [0.347] [0.284] [0.321] [0.379] [0.352] [3.925] [4.029] [4.771] [4.624] [5.149] [4.930] [4.171] 
Av. fiscal balance 0.059 0.081 0.107+ 0.089 0.103+ 0.143+ 0.084 -0.011 -0.008 0.006 0.010 0.037 0.042 0.011 
 [0.073] [0.074] [0.070] [0.071] [0.078] [0.084] [0.107] [0.057] [0.056] [0.059] [0.056] [0.048] [0.048] [0.058] 
Log inflation -5.034 -5.997 -7.217 -9.330+ -8.911+ -9.805+ -13.408** 3.146 3.186 1.518 0.579 3.038 1.933 -3.470 
 [4.943] [5.466] [5.985] [5.941] [5.815] [6.322] [6.342] [3.493] [3.499] [3.693] [3.934] [3.481] [4.238] [3.212] 
Cap. acc. openness 0.121 0.083 0.055 0.012 0.106 -0.005 -0.087 -0.005 -0.009 0.191 0.749 0.619 0.675 0.232 
 [0.336] [0.309] [0.362] [0.330] [0.332] [0.353] [0.368] [1.319] [1.321] [1.272] [0.813] [0.764] [0.798] [0.853] 
British legal origins 0.532 0.505 0.723 0.638 0.447 0.902 0.806        
 [0.695] [0.703] [0.836] [0.745] [0.790] [0.714] [0.752]        
Democracy  2.023+ 2.334+ 2.705* 2.480+ 3.020* 3.193**  -1.413 -0.290 -0.823 -0.909 1.057 -0.886 
  [1.323] [1.552] [1.362] [1.518] [1.534] [1.361]  [1.359] [1.815] [1.643] [1.528] [2.049] [1.637] 
Institutional quality   -0.193 -0.241 0.102 -0.792 0.973   -3.608 -2.446 -0.466 -1.774 -1.935 
   [1.612] [1.437] [1.534] [1.680] [1.329]   [3.511] [3.266] [2.805] [2.932] [2.649] 
Private credit 0.053*** 0.046*** 0.046**     -0.040 -0.040 -0.029     
 [0.010] [0.013] [0.017]     [0.046] [0.046] [0.040]     
Fin. development    11.632** 11.628** 11.967**     -7.754 -7.707 -0.941  
    [4.775] [5.147] [5.300]     [14.458] [14.208] [17.317]  
Bank concentration     0.019       0.012   
     [0.022]       [0.014]   
Foreign bank share      0.010       0.029  
      [0.018]       [0.023]  
LCBM capitalization       0.039       -0.093*** 
       [0.068]       [0.031] 
VIX 0.039** 0.037** 0.030* 0.024+ 0.020 0.015 0.036** 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.041** 0.038** 0.032** 0.024+ 0.039** 
 [0.016] [0.017] [0.016] [0.017] [0.016] [0.017] [0.017] [0.014] [0.014] [0.015] [0.015] [0.012] [0.015] [0.015] 
Constant 26.645 30.114 36.064 46.105+ 43.210+ 47.255+ 61.456* 14.797 17.750 16.443 23.473 21.826 -2.007 51.619** 
 [23.154] [25.574] [28.349] [28.566] [28.557] [30.038] [30.436] [26.229] [26.903] [27.192] [28.611] [28.111] [32.020] [24.576] 
Obs./countries 249/27 249/27 234/26 241/27 225/26 218/23 222/25 249/27 249/27 234/26 241/27 225/26 218/23 222/25 
R
2
/R
2
-within (FE) 0.432 0.454 0.467 0.465 0.487 0.487 0.388 0.155 0.159 0.184 0.179 0.188 0.218 0.258 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is average tenor of outstanding LCBs (years). Sample countries, years and variables as defined in text and Tables A1-A2 in Appendix. All independent variables are 
one-year lagged, except for VIX. Country-clustered standard errors reported in brackets. ***p<0.01;**p<0.05;*p<0.10;+p<0.20.  
14 
 
TABLE 3 
Regression results for average LCB issue yields 
 
 POLS FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log GDP 0.633+ 0.640+ 1.395*** 1.271*** 0.864** 0.781*** 0.937* 0.833** 7.024 6.633 11.685 10.835 7.616 6.622 9.431 23.756** 
 [0.415] [0.419] [0.333] [0.368] [0.378] [0.226] [0.446] [0.278] [11.458] [12.096] [9.667] [8.940] [9.064] [7.124] [9.788] [8.019] 
Log GDP per cap. -1.489** -1.541** -2.571*** -2.347*** -2.419*** -1.592*** -2.881*** -2.227*** -8.959 -8.565 -14.217 -12.504 -11.170 -8.905 -12.159 -28.569** 
 [0.509] [0.513] [0.469] [0.504] [0.483] [0.450] [0.504] [0.359] [13.176] [13.743] [11.126] [11.093] [11.330] [8.984] [11.159] [9.744] 
Av. fiscal balance -0.223 -0.211 -0.214+ -0.211+ -0.178 -0.256* -0.265+ -0.181+ -0.131+ -0.136 -0.125 -0.113 -0.103 -0.084 -0.167 -0.096 
 [0.189] [0.173] [0.129] [0.119] [0.138] [0.136] [0.172] [0.132] [0.094] [0.101] [0.103] [0.097] [0.086] [0.116] [0.128] [0.115] 
Log inflation 34.332*** 33.905*** 23.412*** 24.937*** 21.313** 17.083** 28.435** 19.958** 16.545** 16.590** 16.322** 16.719** 13.160+ 11.188+ 10.733+ 0.311 
 [7.566] [7.082] [5.617] [5.941] [8.761] [5.708] [10.024] [7.497] [5.636] [6.016] [7.306] [6.776] [7.550] [6.581] [6.504] [6.409] 
Cap. acc. openness -0.150 -0.154 -0.411+ -0.320 -0.556+ -0.528** -0.283 -0.277 -2.088 -2.083 -2.109 -0.404 0.113 -0.813 -0.270 0.512 
 [0.272] [0.282] [0.258] [0.275] [0.343] [0.225] [0.287] [0.213] [2.468] [2.479] [2.107] [1.193] [0.976] [0.840] [1.299] [1.202] 
British legal origins 0.266 0.395 0.361 1.435+ 1.529+ 1.932** 1.467+ 2.363**         
 [1.077] [1.184] [0.753] [0.912] [0.878] [0.654] [0.867] [0.804]         
Democracy  0.988 -0.817 0.152 0.541 3.324*** -0.110 1.921+  3.248 1.966 -1.659 -0.759 -9.759+ 8.335 -6.572 
  [1.534] [1.238] [1.283] [1.672] [0.948] [1.140] [1.124]  [10.845] [7.488] [6.109] [4.822] [6.079] [9.950] [5.535] 
Institutional quality   5.764*** 5.582*** 5.185*** 2.670* 4.134** 2.667**   7.581+ 10.734* 6.246 9.596* 6.163 1.786 
   [1.358] [1.520] [1.499] [1.374] [1.652] [0.905]   [5.244] [5.203] [5.698] [4.429] [4.612] [3.455] 
Private credit -0.029+ -0.031+ -0.053**      -0.104+ -0.103+ -0.149**      
 [0.019] [0.020] [0.019]      [0.073] [0.074] [0.055]      
Fin. development    -12.992** -12.007** -12.356**      -44.523* -43.073** -26.485   
    [5.773] [4.319] [4.487]      [21.456] [18.253] [24.119]   
Bank concentration     -0.032+        -0.059***    
     [0.021]        [0.017]    
Foreign bank share      0.050***        0.233***   
      [0.010]        [0.063]   
LCBM capitaliz.       -0.056        -0.073  
       [0.048]        [0.055]  
Av. tenor of LCBs        -0.503***        -0.479 
        [0.115]        [0.381] 
VIX 0.011 0.008 -0.010 -0.015 -0.013 0.011 0.007 -0.020 0.025 0.025 0.005 0.000 0.006 0.029 0.023 0.023 
 [0.046] [0.045] [0.035] [0.032] [0.038] [0.033] [0.036] [0.028] [0.038] [0.038] [0.035] [0.033] [0.042] [0.038] [0.035] [0.036] 
Constant -140.2*** -138.6*** -92.26*** -101.2*** -79.968* -69.047** -112.26** -72.908* -15.302 -19.971 -1.637 -14.012 11.500 -13.962 7.951 164.764** 
 [37.192] [35.239] [27.667] [29.084] [40.858] [28.427] [47.730] [34.782] [79.887] [88.978] [74.596] [78.689] [77.172] [58.482] [80.727] [69.682] 
Obs./countries 123/13 123/13 113/12 117/13 104/13 104/12 111/13 106/13 123/13 123/13 113/12 117/13 104/13 104/12 111/13 106/13 
R
2
/R
2
-within (FE) 0.568 0.570 0.670 0.645 0.660 0.636 0.611 0.669 0.148 0.149 0.203 0.187 0.184 0.300 0.119 0.140 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is average issue yield of LCBs issued over the year (%). Sample countries, years and variables as defined in text and Tables A1-A2 in Appendix. All independent 
variables are one-year lagged, except for VIX. Country-clustered standard errors reported in brackets. ***p<0.01;**p<0.05;*p<0.10;+p<0.20.
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Unlike in Tables 1 and 2, the FE results in Table 3 are largely in line with those of the POLS 
estimations. Most visibly, within-country increases in banking sector size, financial 
development and bank concentration correlate with decreasing average LCB yields, while 
increases in inflation and foreign bank shares go together with rising yields. 
 
d. Robustness 
To check how sensitive our main findings are to changes in sample, variable definitions and 
choice of specification, we have performed a battery of robustness tests. For reasons of 
brevity, we only provides a short summary discussion here and refer to Dafe et al. (2017) for 
the full robustness results. 
First, excluding outliers (cf. Figures A1-A3 in the Appendix) from the samples has little 
effect on our main results. One exception is the negative association between financial 
development and average LCB tenors in the FE model, which becomes statistically 
significant once South Africa is dropped. A possible (but maybe not entirely satisfactory) 
explanation are crowding-out effects, i.e., when banks increase private sector lending they 
may cut back on longer-term government lending (more so than on shorter-term lending). 
Second, replacing our overall financial development index with its sub-indices for financial 
institutions and financial markets shows that especially correlations with the former are 
economically and statistically significant, indicating once more the importance of banks for 
LCBMs. Third, we obtain very similar results when substituting the VIX by other common 
factors, such as international commodity price indices, proxies for global liquidity from the 
BIS or the US Federal Funds rate. Fourth, the inclusion of year dummies hardly affects the 
POLS estimations but renders the coefficient of the financial development index insignificant 
in the FE models, likely by removing even more of the already limited variation in our 
dependent variables. 
Lastly, we have experimented with adding extra variables to our specifications. Our key 
findings are unaltered by augmenting the baseline models with inflation or exchange rate 
volatility, the coefficients of which generally take the expected signs (negative for LCBM 
capitalization and average LCB tenors, and positive for average LCB issue yields). 
Interestingly, we find a significant negative correlation between LCBM capitalization and 
outstanding internationally issued foreign currency bonds (scaled to GDP), at least in a POLS 
regression, but no substitution between LCBs and loans from official or private creditors. 
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Using debt relief dummies, we cannot establish a direct link between debt relief and LCBM 
capitalization, in line with Essers et al. (2016). The correlation between average LCB tenors 
and insurance company assets to GDP, a proxy for the size of the domestic non-bank 
institutional investor base, is positive and strongly significant in a POLS estimation (also 
when excluding outlier South Africa). However, we fail to confirm this positive association 
in the FE model, which may be due to very limited within-country variation in this variable. 
As expected, we find a highly significant positive association between the average LCB issue 
yield and the central bank’s policy rate, the key domestic reference rate. 
 
4. COUNTRY CASE STUDIES 
While cross-country regressions have allowed us to lay bare broad patterns of LCBM 
development in SSA, further country-level analysis is needed to illuminate the routes 
countries have taken to deepen their LCBMs as well as the new opportunities and 
vulnerabilities these expanding LCBMs bring. This section addresses these issues with brief 
case studies of Kenya and Nigeria, two countries where LCBMs have become large enough 
to affect the wider economy.
6
  
 
a. Kenya 
Kenya’s LCBM is highly developed by SSA standards, both with respect to size and maturity. 
Between 2005 and 2014 outstanding local currency Treasury bonds amounted on average to 
13% of GDP in Kenya. In our 28-country sample only Cabo Verde, Mauritius and South 
Africa had a higher average LCBM capitalization over the same period (cf. Figure 1). The 
Kenyan government has also successfully lengthened the tenors of its LCBs. In 2008 the 
Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) issued the first 20-year LCB, followed by a 25-year LCB in 
2010 and a 30-year ‘savings development bond’ in 2011 (Ndung’u, 2011).  
Kenya has a more diversified LCB investor base than most other SSA countries. Whereas 
non-resident investors play a negligible role, holding only about 1% of domestic debt in 2014, 
resident investors include commercial banks (48% of LCBs), local insurance firms (11%), 
parastatals (4%) and other investors (37%), most notably pension funds (AFMI, 2016b). 
Kenyan authorities have also sought to increase retail sector participation. In March 2017 the 
                                                          
6
 More details on Kenya and Nigeria and a third case study on Ghana can be found in Dafe et al. (2017). 
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government issued the first long-awaited M-Akiba bond, a LCB dedicated to infrastructure 
financing sold exclusively by mobile phone with a minimum investment of less than US$30 
equivalent. 
What explains Kenya’s relative success in developing its LCBM? Kenya has several features 
our econometric analysis pointed to as key factors associated with greater LCBM 
capitalization (Table 4). In particular, Kenya has a comparatively well-developed, 
competitive banking sector, comprised mostly of domestic banks. Political initiative is also 
believed to have played an important role. Throughout the 1990s Kenya’s government had a 
thorny relationship with bilateral donors, the World Bank and IMF, who regularly withheld 
financial assistance out of governance concerns (Grosh and Orvis, 1996; IMF, 2008). Finding 
the channel of official borrowing relatively closed and lacking access to international capital 
markets due to high perceived default risk, Kenya began to shift from external to domestic 
borrowing from the late 1990s onwards. 
TABLE 4 
Selected drivers of LCBM development for Kenya and Nigeria 
 
 Kenya Nigeria Sample median  
Log inflation 4.7 4.7 4.6 
Democracy 0.90 0.7 0.75 
Institutional quality 1.5 1.2 1.6 
Private credit 29.1 17.3 16.6 
Fin. development 0.17 0.14 0.11 
Bank concentration 44.3 63.1 77.7 
Foreign bank share 29.1 17.9 60 
 
Notes: Values are 2005-2014 averages. Variables as defined in text and Table A2 in Appendix. Median based on 
sample in Table A1 in Appendix.  
 
In 2001 the government established the Market Leaders Forum, facilitating consultation and 
exchange among LCBM participants, notably the Treasury, CBK, commercial banks, 
insurance companies and diaspora representatives (Ndung’u, 2011). The Forum’s initial 
objective was to lengthen LCB tenors. Over time it has developed into a platform to discuss 
issues such as secondary market development and investor base diversification. 
Kenya has succeeded in mitigating some of the vulnerabilities that may arise from borrowing 
through LCBMs. Between 2005 and 2014 Kenya’s average LCB issue yields amounted to 
12%, above our sample median of 10%. Yet rollover risks were reduced by lengthening LCB 
maturities. In fact, Kenyan LCB tenors averaged nine years between 2005 and 2014, 
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substantially above the six-year sample median. While it remains difficult to pin down the 
exact factors underlying maturity lengthening, Kenya does possess several features that we 
found to correlate with lower borrowing costs, including reasonable inflation, comparatively 
high institutional quality, a well-developed banking sector and a low foreign bank share. 
Kenyan LCBM development has also widened the government’s policy space. For instance, 
between 2009 and 2014 the government was able to finance infrastructure projects through 
six LCBs targeted explicitly to infrastructure development. But while LCBMs provide the 
Kenyan government with funds over which it has significant discretion, it is not free from 
pressures to maintain fiscal discipline. Kenya’s relatively diverse investor base introduces an 
element of competition in the LCBM and adds to secondary market liquidity. As long as 
alternative options are available to domestic investors, governments remain incentivised to 
maintain creditworthiness to attract LCB investment. Moreover, Kenya’s economy has large 
agricultural and tourism sectors and is export-oriented, which implies that public finances are 
vulnerable to shocks arising from drought, terrorism and declines in external demand. This 
too is likely to exert pressures for fiscal discipline.  
 
b. Nigeria 
In relative terms, Nigeria’s LCBM is smaller than Kenya’s, averaging 6% of GDP between 
2005 and 2014. However, with about US$28 billion in Nigerian LCBs outstanding between 
2010 and 2014 versus US$9 billion in Kenya, the absolute size of the former LCBM is much 
larger. Nigeria’s resident investor base is again relatively diversified. Local banks hold about 
37% of total domestic debt, the Central Bank of Nigeria 10% and the non-bank public, 
including the insurance and pension sector, the remainder (DMO, 2015).  
What has driven LCBM expansion in Nigeria? The quality of Nigerian public institutions is 
relatively poor, which does not help the LCBM deepening. Conversely, Nigeria does score 
comparatively well with respect to other important correlates of LCBM capitalization, such 
as a domestically-owned and competitive banking sector (Table 4). The depth of Nigeria’s 
LCBM also results from concerted efforts by the government to rely more on domestic rather 
than external debt after having secured Paris Club debt relief on the latter in 2005. Whereas 
in 2004 78% of the public debt stock was still external and only 22% domestic, this had 
turned around to 19% external and 81% domestic public debt by 2015. The government has 
also been successful in lengthening LCB tenors. In 2007 10-year LCBs represented the 
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longest tenor on offer and accounted for 20% of total issuance. In 2015 the shares of 10- and 
20-year LCBs were 19% and 38% (DMO, 2007; DMO, 2015).  
The Nigerian case also demonstrates some key opportunities and vulnerabilities arising from 
deep LCBMs. As with Kenya, Nigeria’s ability to borrow from LCBMs reduced the reliance 
on external financing. Nigeria has also largely avoided the vulnerabilities arising from 
domestic borrowing at shorter maturities and higher costs, partly because a significant portion 
of borrowing was not intended to fill fiscal gaps but rather to stimulate LCBM development 
(Blommestein and Horman, 2007). Especially before Nigeria’s 2010 banking crisis, oil export 
proceeds provided a comfortable cushion to finance recurrent expenditures. 
Nigeria’s status as a major oil exporter has also been a regular source of economic 
vulnerability. To be sure, sustained oil price declines greatly impact the creditworthiness of a 
government which derives more than 60% of total revenues from oil exports. Oil price 
movements may also have indirect effects on debt sustainability, as Nigeria’s recent 
experience has shown. Between 2011 and 2013 the share of non-resident LCB investment 
increased from 0.7% to 15%, spurred by the inclusion of Nigeria into JP Morgan’s and 
Barclays’ major benchmark indices for emerging market LCBs (Minto, 2012). When in 2014 
the Nigerian government introduced restrictions on foreign exchange transactions to deal 
with forex shortages arising from low oil prices, foreign investors became concerned about 
the liquidity of their investments. Such concerns prompted JP Morgan and Barclays to 
exclude Nigeria from their indices in 2015 and 2016, respectively, causing in turn foreign 
investors to exit and LCB yields to rise (UNCTAD, 2016). This episode illustrates that, 
whereas foreign investment into LCBMs may provide a welcome boost to liquidity, a rapid 
build-up of foreign investor positions can be problematic. The Nigerian case underlines the 
importance of building a base of ‘patient capital’ that is less likely to exit as soon as external 
market conditions deteriorate. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Our empirical analysis of the drivers underlying the development of LCBMs in SSA has 
yielded several interesting results. Importantly, our findings suggest that LCBM 
capitalization is not only related to democracy, institutional quality and financial 
development, but also to financial system structure in SSA. In particular, we find that a high 
concentration in the banking sector correlates negatively with LCBM capitalization, possibly 
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reflecting that oligopolistic returns reduce banks’ incentives to provide longer-term financing 
to governments. A large presence of foreign-owned banks also correlates negatively with 
LCBM capitalization, arguably because foreign banks enjoy more alternative investment 
opportunities abroad than domestic institutions. 
A further contribution is our analysis of LCB tenors and issue yields in SSA. We find that 
both the size of a country’s banking sector and its broader financial development are 
positively correlated with average LCB tenors. Democracy, a proxy of government 
accountability, and low inflation matter too for attracting investments into longer-tenor LCBs. 
As regards LCB issue yields, financial and economic development and, above all, inflation 
appear to be important factors. Using Kenya and Nigeria as illustrative case studies, we have 
highlighted the importance of investor base diversification in order to develop deep, liquid 
and stable LCBMs. While foreign participation in LCBMs can spur their development, it also 
increases the risk of international financial contagion and capital flight in case of external 
shocks.  
We acknowledge that limited within-country variation in our LCBM capitalization, LCB 
tenor and LCB issue yield samples is an important drawback to our econometric analysis. 
Longer time series, preferably at a higher frequency, would help to achieve better 
identification of any causal relations between different dimensions of LCBM development 
and the covariates we employ in our analysis. Ideally, individual bond-level data would allow 
us to construct more detailed measures of LCBM development. In addition, we believe it 
would be interesting to study secondary market variables such as LCBM turnover, bid-ask 
spreads and the evolution of secondary market yields of LCBs in SSA. Currently such data 
are, however, not available (not publicly at least) for most countries in the region. As data 
availability and quality continue to improve, other exciting opportunities for follow-up 
research on SSA LCBMs may open up too, including topics such as investor base 
composition, the role of market infrastructure, such as systems for clearing and settlement 
and electronic trading platforms, and regional integration aspects of LCBM development.  
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE A1 
Country-year samples by dependent variable 
  Dependent variable (available years) 
Country ISO 3 code LCBM 
capitalization 
Average LCB tenors Average LCB issue yields 
Angola AGO 2005-2014 2005-2014 N/A 
Benin BEN 2007-2014 2007-2014 N/A 
Botswana BWA 2003-2014 2003-2014 2003, 2008-2014 
Burkina Faso  BFA 2000-2014 2000, 2001, 2003-2014 N/A 
Burundi BDI 2007-2014 2007-2014 N/A 
Cabo Verde CPV 2000-2014 2000-2014 2000-2014 
Cameroon CMR 2010-2014 2010-2014 N/A 
Chad TCD 2011-2014 2011 N/A 
Cote d'Ivoire CIV 2000-2014 2000-2014 N/A 
Gabon GAB 2007-2014 2007-2014 N/A 
Ghana GHA 2004-2014 2004-2014 2004-2014 
Kenya KEN 2003-2014 2003-2014 2003-2014 
Lesotho LSO 2010-2014 2010-2014 2010-2014 
Malawi MWI 2000-2012 2000-2008 N/A 
Mali MLI 2008-2014 2008-2014 N/A 
Mauritius MUS 2000-2014 2000-2014 2004-2014 
Mozambique MOZ 2000-2014 2000-2004 2001, 2002, 2004, 2005, 
2008-2010, 2013, 2014 
Namibia NAM 2000-2014 2000-2014 2000-2014 
Niger NER 2009-2014 2009-2014 N/A 
Nigeria  NGA 2003-2014 2003-2014 2009-2014 
Rwanda RWA 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008, 2010, 2011, 2014 
Senegal SEN 2005-2014 2005-2014 N/A 
South Africa  ZAF 2003-2014 2003-2014 2011-2014 
Swaziland SWZ 2010-2014 2010-2014 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014 
Tanzania TZA 2002-2014 2002-2014 2002-2014 
The Gambia GMB 2010-2013 2010 N/A 
Togo TGO 2006-2014 2006-2014 N/A 
Uganda  UGA 2004-2014 2004-2014 2004-2014 
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TABLE A2 
Variable names, definitions, sources and descriptive statistics 
   Observations    Standard deviation 
Variable Definition Source Total Countries Years Mean Min  Max overall between within 
Dependent            
LCBM 
capitalization 
Year-end outstanding amount of local currency 
Treasury bonds (in % of GDP) 
AFMI (2016a) 282 28 2000-
2014 
6.681 0.026 40.343 8.560 7.033 4.202 
Average tenor 
of LCBs 
Weighted average tenor of year-end outstanding 
local currency Treasury bonds (in years) 
AFMI (2016a) 261 28 2000-
2014 
6.391 1.512 17.098 2.739 2.323 1.345 
Average issue 
yield of LCBs 
Weighted average yield at issuance of all local 
currency Treasury bonds issued over the year 
(in %) 
AFMI (2016a) 128 14 2000-
2014 
10.971 4.231 24.264 4.236 3.373 2.465 
Independent            
Log GDP Logarithm of GDP (in current US$ billion) IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO)  420 28 1999-
2013 
2.054 -0.679 6.257 1.412 1.342 0.502 
Log GDP per 
capita 
Logarithm of GDP per capita (in current US$) WEO 420 28 1999-
2013 
6.830 4.691 9.392 1.087 1.023 0.411 
Fiscal balance 3-year moving average of general government net 
lending/borrowing (in % of GDP) 
WEO; IMF Fiscal Monitor 409 28 1999-
2013 
-1.616 -
17.840 
13.688 4.124 2.573 3.262 
Log inflation Logarithm of the y-o-y change in average 
consumer prices 
WEO 420 28 1999-
2013 
4.676 4.517 6.052 0.121 0.080 0.092 
Capital account 
openness 
Chinn-Ito coding of restrictions on cross-border 
financial transactions based on IMF Annual Report 
on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions 
Chinn-Ito KAOPEN database 420 28 1999-
2013 
0.292 0 1 0.292 0.292 0.054 
British legal 
origins 
Dummy which equals 1 for countries with a British 
common law heritage and 0 otherwise 
Andrei Schleifer’s personal website: 
http://scholar.harvard.edu/shleifer 
420 28 2000-
2014 
0.429 0 1 0.495 0.504 0 
Democracy 0-1 normalized (revised) Polity 2 score Polity IV Project database 420 28 1999-
2013 
0.631 0.050 1 0.265 0.258 0.076 
Institutional 
quality 
Unweighted sum of 0-1 normalized scores on four 
dimensions: ‘control of corruption’, ‘government 
effectiveness’, ‘regulatory quality’ and ‘rule of 
law’ 
World Bank World Governance Indicators  351 27 2001; 
2003-
2013 
1.622 0.712 2.688 0.436 0.433 0.097 
Private sector 
credit 
Domestic private sector credit by deposit money 
banks and other financial institutions (in % of 
GDP) 
World Bank Global Financial 
Development Database (GFDD) 
412 28 1999-
2013 
22.841 1.140 150.210 26.680 26.351 5.563 
Financial 
development 
Composite index of financial development, 
capturing the depth, access and efficiency of 
financial institutions and financial markets 
Svirydzenka (2016) 420 28 1999-
2013 
0.140 0.046 0.637 0.105 0.105 0.020 
Bank 
concentration 
Assets of 3 largest commercial banks (in % of total 
commercial banking assets) 
GFDD 371 28 1999-
2013 
78.058 23.324 100 18.326 15.353 10.637 
Foreign bank 
share 
Number of foreign owned banks (as % of total 
number of banks in the economy)  
GFDD 345 23 1999-
2013 
54.609 0 100 24.668 23.869 7.873 
VIX Yearly averaged Chicago Board of Options 
Exchange Volatility Index measuring implied 
volatility of S&P 500 index options 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 420 28 2000-
2014 
20.941 12.810 32.690 6.367 0 6.367 
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FIGURE A1. LCBM capitalization vs. explanatory variables 
 
Notes: Sample countries, years and variables as defined in text and Tables A1-A2 in Appendix. All explanatory variables are one-year lagged. Grey dots are data points for South Africa and 
Mauritius. Full lines represent best linear fit for whole sample, dashed lines for sample excluding South Africa and Mauritius.  
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FIGURE A2. Average LCB tenors vs. explanatory variables 
 
Notes: Sample countries, years and variables as defined in text and Tables A1-A2 in Appendix. All explanatory variables are one-year lagged. Grey dots are data points for South Africa. Full 
lines represent best linear fit for whole sample, dashed lines for sample excluding South Africa.  
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FIGURE A3. Average LCB issue yields vs. explanatory variables 
 
Notes: Sample countries, years and variables as defined in text and Tables A1-A2 in Appendix. All explanatory variables are one-year lagged. Grey dots are data points for Ghana and 
Mozambique. Full lines represent best linear fit for whole sample, dashed lines for sample excluding Ghana and Mozambique.
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FIGURE A4. LCBM capitalization vs. average tenors vs. average issue yields 
 
Notes: Sample countries, years and variables as defined in text and Tables A1-A2 in Appendix. Variables on x-
axis are one-year lagged. Grey dots are data points for South Africa and Mauritius in panel (a); for Ghana, 
Mozambique, South Africa and Mauritius in panel (b); and for Ghana, Mozambique and South Africa in panel 
(c). Full lines represent best linear fit for whole sample. Dashed lines represent best linear fit for sample 
excluding data points in grey. 
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